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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TERRY B. COGAN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

Case No. 890060-CA

LINDA S. COGAN
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
This is an Appeal pursuant to Rule 3(a), R. Utah Ct.
App.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether Defendant/Appellant can bring a Petition

for Modification and/or Enforcement of a New Mexico Decree of
Divorce filed in Utah pursuant to the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.
2.

Whether

Defendant/Appellant

is

entitled

to

an

award to attorney's fees on appeal.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION THOUGHT
TO BE DETERMINATIVE OF ISSUES
The Utah Foreign Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann., Sections
78-22a-l through 8 (1983).

The specific language to be construed

is found in Utah Code Ann., Section 78-22a-2

(1) and

follows:
(1) For purposes of this chapter, "foreign
judgment" means any judgment, decree, or
order of a court of the United States or of
any other court whose acts are entitled to
full faith and credit in this state.

(2) as

(2) A copy of a foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with an appropriate act
of Congress or an appropriate act of Utah may
be filed with the county clerk of any county
in Utah.
The clerk of the district court
shall treat the foreign judgment in all
respects as a judgment of a district court of
Utah.
A judgment filed under this chapter
has the same effect and is subject to the
same procedures, defenses, and proceedings
for reopening, vacating, setting aside, or
staying, as a judgment of a district court of
this state and is subject to enforcement and
satisfaction in like manner.
The Utah Long-Arm Statute, Utah Code Ann. Section 7827-24(6)

(1987) relating to "divorce, separate maintenance, or

child support" which provides:
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10102, whether or not a citizen or resident of
this state, who in person or through an agent
does any of the following enumerated acts,
submits himself, and if an individual, his
personal representative, to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this state as to any claim
arising from:
****

(6) with respect to actions of divorce,
separate maintenance, or child support,
having resided, in the martial relationship,
within this state notwithstanding subsequent
departure from the state; or the commission
in this state of the act giving rise to the
claim, so long as that act is not a mere
omission, failure to act, or occurrence over
which the defendant had no control;
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 13, 1988 Defendant filed an exemplified copy
of a Final Decree of Dissolution entered in the 9th Judicial
District, Roosevelt County, New Mexico with the Clerk of the
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County (R.2-5) Defendant
also filed a Petition for Modification of this Decree (R.6-24)
- 2 -

and on October 28, 1988 Defendant served an Amended Petition for
Modification

on

Plaintiff.

(R.64-82)

Defendant

modification and enforcement of the Decree.

sought

both

(R.6-24;64-82)

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative a Motion to Quash (R.31-32) which was granted by the court.
(R.61-63)

This appeal was taken to the Utah Court of Appeals.

(R.83)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 2, 1987 a Final Decree of Dissolution was
entered

in

Case

No.

86-DR161, 9th Judicial

District Court,

Roosevelt County, New Mexico between Plaintiff, appearing as
Petitioner Pro Se, and Defendant, being without representation.
(R.2-3)

Defendant signed a waiver of appearance, settlement

agreement and approved the Final Decree. (R.2-4)

No reference

was made to alimony in the Final Decree or proceedings thereafter.

(R.2-4;ll-24)
Defendant supported and maintained Plaintiff while he

attended college from 1982-1986; Plaintiff graduated from college
in December, 1986; commenced

legal action for Dissolution on

December 15, 1986; the court dissolved the marriage on January 2,
1987; and thereafter Plaintiff passed the CPA examination and
became a CPA with a firm in Roswell, New Mexico.

(R.7,47,74)

Defendant is now a resident of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah where she resides with the two minor children of the
parties, Ashley Brann Cogan, dob 12-19-81, and Chondra Michelle
Cogan, dob 8-19-75.

(R.6,11-12)

Defendant is now a resident of

- 3 -

Chaves County, State of New Mexico.

(R.45,47)

The Final Decree entered January 2, 1987 provided for
$300,00 per month as support money for the two minor children of
the parties.

(R.12)

At the time of the entry of the Final

Decree; (1) Defendant earned $1,410.00 per month, (2) Plaintiff
was unemployed, (3) Chondra was in grade school, and (4) Ashley
was not yet attending school.

(R.7)

By October 13, 1988, the following changes had taken
place; (1) the Consumer Price Index had increased approximately
7%, (2) Defendant's earnings decreased to $1,250.00 per month,
(3) Plaintiff was a CPA earning a minimum of $3,000.00 per month,
(4) Chondra was in middle school with additional financial needs,
and (5) Ashley is now attending school with additional financial
needs.
Plaintiff was to pay the deductibles on the health and
dental insurance for the minor children of the parties up to
$200.00 per year and one-half of any medical or dental expense
incurred by the said minor children not covered by insurance.
(R.17,21)
On October 13, 1988 Defendant filed an exemplified copy
of the Final Decree of Dissolution with the Clerk of the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County
Modification.

(R.6-24)

(R.2-5) and a Petition for

Plaintiff was served in Roswell, New

Mexico on October 19, 1988.

(R.47,48)

An affidavit was filed on October 13, 1988 setting
forth the last known address of Plaintiff (judgment debtor) which
- 4 -

did not correctly identify the status of the parties and the
Notice of Judgment sent pursuant thereto was incorrect. (R.27-30)
A correct affidavit was filed on November 23, 1988 and a correctly mailed Notice of Judgment was mailed to Plaintiff on said
date. (R.45,46)
An Amended

Petition

for Modification was served on

Plaintiff on October 28, 1988 (R.64-69) which is identical to the
original Petition with the exception of the addition of a request
for

"equitable

restitution"

as

an

alternative

to

alimony.

(R.7,65;6-24;64-82)
Defendant's Petition-Amended Petition for Modification
seeks (1) an award of alimony or equitable restitution, (2) an
increase in the child support for the minor children of the
parties, (3) judgment for an income tax deficiency, (4) judgment
for various insurance deductibles and one half of non-covered
medical and dental expenses, and (5) attorney's fees and costs,
(R.6-24;64-82)
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative a Motion to Quash service on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction

of

Plaintiff.

subject

matter

and

personal

jurisdiction

over

(R.31-33)

The aforesaid Motions were argued before the Court and
the Court ruled that Defendant's Petition-Amended Petition was
not well taken as to the modification or enforcement of her
rights under the New Mexico Decree of Divorce.
Court granted Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss.
- 5 -

(R.52-60)

(R.61-62)

The

Defendant took this Appeal.

(R.83)

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court's dismissal of Defendant's PetitionAmended

Petition presents a question of law which should be

reviewed for its correctness with no particular deference to said
ruling.

Mountain Fuel Supply v. Salt Lake City, 752 P. 2d 884,

887 (Utah 1988).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff has been given notice of Defendant's claims
against him and has had the opportunity to appear and defend
against the said claims all of which comports with notions of
fair play and substantial justice.
Plaintiff

has

sufficient

minimum

contacts

with

the

State of Utah including: (1) an ex-wife with an alimony claim,
(2) an ex-wife being pursued by the IRS due to Plaintiff's
negligence or error in preparing the 1985 income tax returns, (3)
his two children are attending public school in the State of
Utah,

(4) he has failed to pay insurance deductibles and his

share

of

non-covered

medical

and

dental

expense,

(5) he is

current in his payments of support money to Defendant, (6) he has
extensive visitation

rights with his children

some of which

presumably will be exercised in the State of Utah, (7) he has
agreed to communicate with Defendant regarding the children's
physical, emotional and mental health, and (8) he has agreed to
pay

transportation

costs

to

and

exercising visitation.
- 6 -

from

the State

of Utah

in

Defendant's claims for alimony or equitable restitution, increased child support, payment of the IRS assessment,
judgment for the deductibles and non-covered medical and dental
expense are causes of action arising out of Plaintiff's commission of acts in the State of Utah either directly or indirectly.
A fair balancing of the equities and convenience of the
parties, minor children of the parties and the State of Utah tips
the

scales

of

justice

in favor of in personam

jurisdiction

requiring Plaintiff to make his defense to Defendant's claims in
the State of Utah rather than have Defendant travel to New Mexico
to assert these claims.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF HAS SIGNIFICANT MINIMUM CONTACTS WITH THE
STATE OF UTAH PROVIDING A FAIR AND REASONABLE BASIS FOR THE
EXERCISE

OF

IN

PERSONAM

JURISDICTION

REQUIRING

PLAINTIFF TO

Statue relating to

"divorce...or

CONDUCT HIS DEFENSE IN THIS STATE.
The Utah

Long Arm

child support," supra,

provides that the service on a party be

made pursuant to Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Code Ann. Section 78-27-25.
with this Rule.

(R.47,48)

Utah

Plaintiff was served in accordance
The Utah Long Arm Statute was raised

and argued to the Court below.

(R. 36,53,58)

The Utah State Legislature declared the public policy
behind the Long Arm Statute which is set forth in Utah Code Ann.
Section 78-27-22 as follows:
- 7 -

It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination, that the public interest
demands the state provide its citizens with
an effective means of redress against
nonresident persons, who, through certain
significant minimal contacts with this state,
incur obligations to citizens entitled to the
state's protection. This legislative action
is deemed necessary because of technological
progress which has substantially increased
the flow of commerce between the several
states resulting in increased interaction
between persons of this state and persons of
other states.
The provisions of this act, to ensure
maximum protection to citizens of this state,
should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the
fullest extent permitted by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
This legislative mandate was vigorously applied by the
Utah Supreme Court in Mallory Engineering v. Ted R. Brown &
Assoc., 618 P.2d 1004 (Utah 1980) where the Court ruled at 1006:
Although early decisions concerning the
scope of this legislation applied a restrictive interpretation, this Court's most recent
decisions recognize the expansive grant of
jurisdictional power which the legislation
embodies.
As we explained in Abbott G. M.
Diesel, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft:
Because our Legislature in 1969 declared
in clear, specific and mandatory terms
that the scope of that personal jurisdiction should be enlarged "to the
fullest extent permitted by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment",
this
Court
herein
acknowledges that this state's jurisdictional standard should not be more
restrictive than those allowed by
federal due process limitations.
The

Court

in

Mallory,

supra,

then

analyzed

the

applicable constitutional principles announced in International
- 8 -

Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed.
95 (1945) and Milliken v. Mever, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339,
342, 343, 85 L.Ed. 378 (1940), and formulated the following test
relating to long arm jurisdiction based on the minimum contact
standard at 618 P.2d 1007:
The resultant standard for determining a
nonresident's amenability to the jurisdiction
of the state courts is not whether the
nonresident is 'present' in the state, but
rather whether the nonresident has such
contacts with the 'state of the forum as make
it reasonable, in the context of our federal
system of government, to require the (nonresident) to defend the particular suit which
is brought.' (Emphasis added.) This reasonableness standard, incorporating the requirements of fair play and substantial justice,
looks to the quality and nature of the
nonresident's contacts with the forum state.
Therefore, the central concern of the inquiry
into personal jurisdiction is the relationship of the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation, to each other.
The Court went on to state at 618 P. 2d 1008 that a
defendant was amenable to suit in Utah:
....if the quality and nature of the defendant's activity is such that it is reasonable
and fair to require him to conduct his
defense in this state.
****

Reduced to more practical terms, the
remaining inquiry involved in ascertaining
the restrictions presented by the requirements of fair play and substantial justice
concerns; (1) Whether the cause of action
arises out of or has a substantial connection
with the activity; and (2) The balancing of
the convenience of the parties and the
interests of the State in assuming jurisdiction.
Plaintiff

has

the

following

contacts with the State of Utah:
- 9 -

significant

minimum

1.

Plaintiff obtained a pro se divorce from defendant

who was unrepresented by counsel and no provisions were made for
alimony

in the initial or subsequent proceedings.

Plaintiff

could have raised and disposed of the issue of alimony in the New
Mexico Court but failed to do so.
One of the purposes of alimony is "...to prevent the
spouse from becoming a public charge."
395, 397 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)

Eames v. Eames, 73 5 P.2d

Thus, Defendant may avoid becoming

a public charge to the State of Utah by being allowed her claim
for alimony or equitable restitution.
2.

Plaintiff negligently and erroneously prepared the

federal tax return for the parties in 1985 leading to the assessment from the IRS against Defendant which she does not have the
ability to pay and which Plaintiff has refused to pay thereby
causing

financial

hardship

children of the parties.
3.

to

Defendant

and

the

two

minor

(R.8)

The two minor children of the parties, Ashley, age

7, and Chondra, age 13, are residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
with defendant and are attending public schools.
4.

(R.2,3,7,8)

Plaintiff is required to pay $200.00 per year on

the deductibles on the health and dental insurance policies for
the minor children of the parties and one-half of all non-covered
expenses.

Plaintiff is currently in arrears in the payment of

the deductibles and non-covered medical and dental expenses in
the sum of $403.60 which could seriously affect the continued
health and dental care of the minor children, impose an addition- 10 -

al financial burden on Defendant and impact local health care
providers.

(R.9,10,17,21)
5.

Plaintiff has been paying the original support

money for the minor children of the parties directly to Defendant
and is current in the payments in that no claim for arrearages
have been made.
6.

The original decree of divorce dated January 2,

1987 provided that Plaintiff should receive "reasonable rights of
visitation."

(R.2,3)

In a Stipulated

Agreement

filed and

approved by the Court on November 24, 1987, Plaintiff was to
receive

greatly

expanded

visitation

rights

with

the

minor

children of the parties including: every other weekend; four
weeks in the summer; arrangements for Christmas, Easter/Spring
Break,

Thanksgiving,

Father's

Day,

Mother's

matters relating to said visitation.

Day,

(R.19,20,21)

and

other

Plaintiff

obviously cares a great deal for his children and it can reasonably be expected that he will visit them and be present in the
State of Utah and additionally, be required to pay for their
transportation

from Salt Lake City to Roswell

transportation

required

in effectuating

the

and any other

said visitation.

(R.20)
?•

The stipulated agreement dated November 24, 1987

further provides: "4. The parties agreed to keep each other fully
informed
health."

of

the

(R.21)

children's

physical,

emotional

and

mental

This could result in interstate communication

initiated by Plaintiff to the State of Utah via telephone or
- 11 -

mails.
It is submitted

that these are significant minimum

contacts that constitute the commission of acts in the State of
Utah giving rise to Defendant's claims in her Petition-Amended
Petition.

The Legislature amended Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-

24 with the adoption H.B. No. 37, 47th Utah Legislature, Laws of
Utah 1987, Chapter 35 wherein the Bill was:
An Act relating to the Judicial Code;
establishing long arm jurisdiction for
collection of child support; and clarifying
long arm provisions regarding divorce and
separate maintenance actions.
The amendment added child support to long arm jurisdiction and provided:
(6) with respect to actions of divorce
[ and], separate maintenance, [-fche-majrnfcenanee
in—this—9-tea-tee-- <©€—a--mafey±monial--^omiei-l-e—ate
the—ti«e—the—etaim-a*ose] or child support,
having resided, in the marital relationship,
within this state notwithstanding subsequent
departure from the state; or the commission
in this state of the act giving rise to the
claim, so long as that act is not a mere
omission, failure to act, or occurrence over
which the defendant had no control;
It is submitted that the acts of Plaintiff complained
of by Defendant in her Petition-Amended Petition were acts of
commission and within the ambit of the amended Long Arm Statute.
If a party failed to pay support money or alimony or
spousal support or other economic provisions or benefits of any
kind, this could arguably be a "mere omission, failure to act,"
which certainly was not intended by the Legislature.

In order

for the Long Arm Statute to have any meaning or utility to a
- 12 -

party in need of child support, alimony, maintenance or other
economic support, the last clause of Subsection

(6) must be

narrowly construed and placed in proper prospective.
In the case of Johansen v. Johansen, 305 N.W.2d 383
(S.D. 1981) the South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed a finding of
jurisdiction over the non-resident Defendant based solely on the
minor child's domicile in the State.
father

"has purposefully

failed

The Court ruled that the

to support his minor child"

residing in South Dakota; the cause of action for child support
arose out of this purposeful act; and at 305 N.W.2d 387:
Finally, the requirement of fair play
and substantial justice militates against
denial of jurisdiction...Public policy
demands that this child receive its inherent
right of support.
Moreover, denial of
jurisdiction would place an onerous burden
upon appellee.
She would be required, at
great expense and inconvenience, to return to
Minnesota or proceed to Wyoming to seek
support for this child. Were it not for the
public policy requiring support of the child,
this might be a very close question; however,
the presence of such public policy, which the
legislature recognized as sufficient to
support jurisdiction in SDCL 15-7-2(7), tips
the scales of fair play and substantial
justice decidedly in favor of sustaining
jurisdiction.
The case of Hazen and Henderson, 702 P. 2d 1143 (Or.
App. 1985) is also in point.

Both parties had moved from the

state of the matrimonial domicile with the custodial parent,
mother,

and

child

residing

in Oregon

parent, father, residing in Ohio.

and

the

non-custodial

The mother and child had no

contacts with Ohio and the Oregon Court found jurisdiction based
on (1) his payment of support money, (2) his communication with

the mother about visitation, and (3) he had visited the child in
Oregon,
The Court of Appeals of Oregon ruled as follows at 702
P.2d 1147:
Oregon has a substantial interest in
facilitating child-support actions on behalf
of its resident children•
Further, the
interests of mother and the child in proceeding with this cause in Oregon must be
considered. (Citing Case)
We conclude that the quality and nature
of father's activity in Oregon are such that
it is reasonable to require him to conduct
his defense here. International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, supra, 326 U.S. at 316, 317, 66
S.Ct. at 158.
"[T]he relationship among
[father], the forum, and the litigation,"
Shaffer v. Heitner, supra, 433 US at 204, 97
S.Ct. at 2580, is such that Oregon is a
"fair" forum in this case. The maintenance
of this matter in Oregon does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
The Oregon Court distinguished on a factual basis the
case of Kulko v. California Superior Court, 346 U.S. 84, 98 S.Ct.
1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978).

The Kulko case is also distinguish-

able from the instant case in that the only point of contact the
custodial father, a New York resident, had with California was
that he allowed his children to move to California to live with
their mother.
there

were

Six Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court held that

not

sufficient

minimum

contacts

to

support

the

exercise of in personam jurisdiction over the father and the
ruling

of

the

California

Supreme

Court

finding

jurisdiction

existed was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
- 14 -

Three Justices dissented and the dissent stated at 34 6
U.S. 102:
I cannot say that the Court's determination against state-court in personam jurisdiction is implausible, but, though the issue
is close, my independent weighing of the
facts leads me to conclude, in agreement with
the analysis and determination of the
California Supreme Court, that appellant's
connection with the State of California was
not too attenuated, under the standards of
reasonableness and fairness implicit in the
Due Process Clause, to require him to conduct
his defense in the California courts.
It

should

be

further

noted

that

the Utah

Foreign

Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. Section 78-22a-l et seq. was adopted
by the Legislature in 1983 from the Uniform Act which is entitled
"Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act." (Emphasis Added)
In the recent case of Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P. 2d 791
(Utah 1988) a dubious foreign judgment was docketed pursuant to
the Utah Foreign Judgment Act and rather than refusing to enforce
the judgment on the usual constitutional grounds for Defendant's
lack of minimum contacts with the rendering state and dismissing
the action, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
Order setting aside the foreign judgment thereby opening the case
for further litigation of the non-resident Plaintiff's claim in
the forum state.

The Court ruled at 763 P.2d 795:

A foreign judgment filed in this
jurisdiction is treated in all respects like
a judgment of the district court of Utah and
is therefore subject to being vacated and set
aside in a like manner.
It was therefore
appropriate for the district court to vacate
and set aside the Mississippi judgment.
It is submitted that the Legislative enactment of the
- 15 -

Uniform Act without the word "Enforcement" and the ruling of the
Utah Supreme Court in Bradford v. Nacrle, supra, give addition
meaning to key language of the Utah Foreign Judgment Act when it
states in Utah Code Ann. 78-22a-2(2):
A judgment filed under this chapter has
the same effect and is subject to the same
procedures, defenses, and proceedings for
reopening, vacating, setting aside, or
staying, as a judgment of a district court of
this state and is subject to enforcement and
satisfaction in like manner.
The Utah Foreign Judgment Act contemplates cases such
as Defendant's Petition-Amended Petition being brought against
defaulting

non-resident

parties

and

should

be

considered

in

"balancing the convenience of the parties and the interests of
the State in assuming jurisdiction."

Mailory, supra.

POINT II
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES ON
APPEAL.
Based

on

the

comparative

financial

condition

and

ability to pay Plaintiff and Defendant, (R.7-10) Defendant should
be awarded attorney's fees on appeal.
30-3-3 and 5.

Utah Code Ann. Sections

Stuber v. Stuber. 121 Utah 632, 244 P.2d 650

(1952).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff

has

sufficient

minimum

contacts

with

the

State of Utah which do not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice and violate the Due Process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Defendant's claims arise out of

- 16 -

Plaintiff's

commission

of

directly or indirectly.

acts in the State

of Utah

either

A fair balancing of the equities and

convenience of the parties, the minor children of the parties and
the State of Utah tips the scales in favor of a finding of in
personam jurisdiction.

Defendant is entitled to an award of

attorney's fees on appeal.
Respectfully Submitted,

Wendell P. Abies
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the
two

day of May, 1989,

(2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief were

mailed, postage prepaid, to Randall J. Holmgren, Attorney for
Plaintiff/Respondent,

50 West Broadway, 9th Floor, Salt Lake

City, Utah 84101.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

&

IN AND FOR SALT. LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TERRY B . COGAN,
PETITION FOR MODIFICATION

Plaintiff,

C a s e No.

vs.
LINDA S. COGAN,

Judge

*V*«>* p .

\)>J% \ \ ^ . I h ^ ^ ^ l

Defendant•
Linda S.

Cogan, Defendant herein, hereby petitions the

Court for a Modification of the Decree of

Divorce entered herein

on January 2, 1987 as follows:
1..

She

is the

Defendant

in the above action and

resides in Salt Lake County, State of Utah together with

the two

minor children of Plaintiff and Defendant, Ashley Brann Cogan and
Chondra Michelle Cogan.
2.
Plaintiff

and

The Decree
Defendant

of Divorce

was entered

by and between

in the Ninth Judicial District Court,

State of New Mexico, County of Roosevelt on January 2, 1987, Case
No. 86DR161,

an exemplified

copy of which is attached hereto as

Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference.
3.

Said Exhibit "A" has been filed

with the

clerk of

the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and has the
status as set forth in U.C.A., Section 78-22a-l et seq. and is in
all respects the same as a Utah Judgment or Decree.

4.

There

is

no

provision in respect to alimony in

Exhibit "A" and Defendant is entitled to an alimony award
sum

of

$2 0,000.00

based

on

her

support

Plaintiff while he attended college from
awarded a

degree in

and

in the

maintenance of

1982-1986; when

he was

December, 1986; contemporaneously therewith

divorced Defendant; passed the CPA Examination

and became

a CPA

approximately six months thereafter.
5.

At the

time of the entry of Exhibit "A" and Order

of support money for the two
entered in

the sum

minor children

of the

parties was

of $300.00 per month for both children which

was based on the following factors:

6and

material

A*

Defendant's earnings of $1,410.00 per month.

B.

Plaintiff's unemployment.

C.

Chondra being in grade school.

D.

Ashley not yet attending school.

Defendant alleges
changes

of

that

the

following substantial

circumstances have occurred since the

entry of Exhibit "A:"
A.

The

Consumer

Prize

Index

has

increased by

approximately 7%.
B.

Defendant's

earnings

have

decreased

to

$1,250.00 per month.
C.
Roswell,

New

Plaintiff is now a CPA with

Mexico

and

upon

information

minimum of $3,000.00 per month.

2

a large

firm in

and belief earns a

D.

Chondra is now attending middle school and has

additional financial needs.
E.

Ashley

is

now

attending

school

and

has

additional financial needs.
7.

Exhibit "A"

support money

should be

from $300.00

per month per child

or a

modified by

per month
total of

increasing the

for both children to $300

$600.00 per

month until the

said children reach their 21st birthday.
8.

Plaintiff prepared

all of

the income tax returns

for the parties during the course

of the

marriage based

on his

expertise in filing tax returns; his ongoing school in accounting
and business

oriented

status;

Defendant's

and

courses;

his

total

decree

lack

of

and

potential CPA

expertise and in fact

naivety in filing tax returns.
9.

The joint tax returns

for the

parties prepared by

Plaintiff and filed with the IRS for the tax year ending December
31, 1985 was negligently and erroneously
assessment from

prepared leading

to an

the IRS when Defendant does not have the ability

to pay the same and when Plaintiff has ample funds

with which to

pay the said indebtedness in the sum of $457.14 together with any
future penalties and interest.
10.
of

which

is

Paragraph 5A of the "Settlement Agreement"
attached

herein by reference, made
Plaintiff service

a copy

hereto

as

Exhibit "B" and incorporated

part

of

Exhibit

"A",

provides that

the community indebtedness and that the amount

owed to the IRS is a community indebtedness.
3

11.
"Stipulated

Paragraph 1 of Exhibit "B" and

Agreement

and

dated November 24, 1987,
Exhibit "C"

Order

shall

pay

$200.00

which is

attached hereto as

herein by reference, provides that

Defendant will maintain medical
tiff

of a

Proving Stipulated Agreement"

copies of

and incorporated

paragraph 2A

per

and dental

insurance and Plain-

child per year for deductibles if

required and one-half of any sums

not covered

by the

health or

dental insurance.
12.

Since

January

1, 1988 Defendant has maintained

medical and dental insurance on the minor children of the parties
with a $2 00.00 per year deductible for each and so far Ashley has
incurred medical expense in
incurred medical

the sum

expense in

Defendant $145.34 for Ashley

of $145.34

and Chondra has

the sum of $316.63.
and

$258.32

for

Plaintiff owes

Chondra

and has

willfully refused to pay the same.
13.
of an attorney

Defendant has been required to retain the services
to

obtain

the

modification

of

the

Decree of

Divorce entered herein and Plaintiff should be required to pay to
Defendant, for the use and benefit of her

attorney, a reasonable

attorney's fee and costs.
WHEREFORE,

Defendant

prays

for

Judgment

against

Plaintiff as follows:
1.

That she be given

an alimony

award in

the sum of

$20,000.00.
2.

That

support

money

be increased to $300.00 per

month per child until the children reach 21 years of age.
4

3.

Judgment in

the

sum

of

$457.10

for

income tax

deficiency for 1985.
4.

Judgment in the sum of $403.60 for deductibles and

one-half of non-covered expenses.
5.

A reasonable attorney's fee and costs.

6.

Such other relief or

modification the

court deems

appropriate under the circumstances.
Dated this 1 ^ ^ day of October, 1988.

'^j^fi^oQjl
Wendell P. Abies
Attorney for Defendant
STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
Linda

S.

says as follows:
the

foregoing

ss.
Cogan,

being

that she is the

Petition

for

first duly sworn, deposes and
Defendant herein

Modification;

allegations contained therein are true to
belief except

as to

those matters

and has read

and that all of the

her own

knowledge and

alleged upon information and

belief and as to those matters, she believes the same to be true.
Dated this

day of October, 198i

'MS
J. V:
da S. Cogan/
and sworn to before

me

October
Notary Public
Defendant's Address:
8843 South Alpen Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

this

_JJ2^» day of

IN THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF NEW MEXICO

9TH JUOICIAL DISTRICT
ROOSEVELT COUNTY. N.M.
FILED IN MY OFFICE

COUNTY OF ROOSEVELT

'87 JfiN 2 API 10 34

TERRY B. COGAN,

)

PETITIONER PRO 3E,

)

V.

)

CLERK. DISTRICT COURT

LINDA S. COGAN,

)

HO. MJ&AI

RESPONDENT.

)
FINAL DECREE

THIS NATTER HAVING COME ON BEFORE THE COURT OH THE
PETITION FOR DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE FILED HEREIN, AMD THE
PETITIONER HAVING APPEARED PRO SE AND THE RESPONDENT HAVING
APPEARED NOT; HOWEVER, IT FURTHER APPEARING FROM THE RECORD
THAT THE RESPONDENT HAS SIGNED A WAIVER OF APPEARANCE AND
HAS ENTERED INTO A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND HAS APPROVED THIS
FINAL DECREE, AND THE COURT BEING FULLY ADVISED IN THE
PREMISES FINDS:
1.

THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OF THE PARTIES HERETO

AND OF THE SUBJECT MATTER HEREIN.
2.

THAT THE PARTIES ARE IRRECONCILABLY INCOMPATIBLE

AND THE COURT SHALL GRANT THE DISSOLUTION OF THE MARRIAGE OF
THE PARTIES.
3.

THAT THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY AND

BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS FAIR AND JUST AND SHALL BE APPROVED BY
THIS COURT.
4.

THAT RESPONDENT SHALL HAVE THE CARE, CUSTODY AND

CONTROL OF THE MINOR CHILDREN OF THE PARTIES, NAMELY, ASHLEY
PPAMKI r:r>!-,A!-l. RORM DECEMBER .19, 19!;:j , AMD ClfUNDRA MICHELLE

COGAN, BORN AUGUST-19, 1975, WITH PETITIONER HAVING REASONABLE
RIGHTS OF VISITATION.
5.

THAT PETITIONER SHALL PAY AS AND FOR CHILD SUPPORT

OF THE MINOR CHILDREN OF THE PARTIES THE SUM OF $300.00 PER MONTH
UNTIL ASHLEY BRANN COGAN REACHES 18 YEARS OF AGE, BECOMES
EMANCIPATED OR UNTIL FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT, WITH SUCH
CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS BEGINNING JANUARY 1, 1987, DUE AND
PAYABLE ON THE FIRST DAY OF EACH MONTH THEREAFTER.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUSTED AND DECREED THAT:
1.

THE PETITIONER SHALL. BE AMD HEREBY IS AWARDED A

DISSOLUTION OF THE MARRIAGE OF THE PARTIES AND THE PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT SHALL BE AMD HEREBY ARE•RESTORED TO THE STATUS OF
SINGLE PERSONS.
2.

THAT RESPONDENT SHALL BE AND HEREBY 13 AWARDED THE

CARE, CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF THE PARTIES' MINOR CHILDREN,
ASHLEY BRANN COGAN, BORN DECEMBER: 19, 1981 AND CHONDRA MIGHEI.LE
COGAN, BORN AUGUST 19\ 1975, AND THAT PETITIONER SHALL BE AND
HEREBY IS AWARDED REASONABLE RIGHTS OF VISITATION THEREOF.
3.

THAT PETITIONER SHALL BE, AND HEREBY IS, ORDERED

TO PAY SUPPORT FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE PARTIES'S MINOR CHILDREN
IN THE AMOUNT OF $300.00 PER MONTH, PAYABLE UNTIL ASHLEY BRANN
COGAN REACHES 18 YEARS OF AGE, BECOMES EMANCIPATED OR UNTIL
FURTHER ORDER OF THIS COURT; AND THAT RESPONDENT SHALL BE
RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING THE MINOR CHILDREN ON HER HEALTH
AND DENTAL INSURANCE PLAN, WITH ALL AMOUNTS NOT COVERED,
INCLUDING DEDUCTIBLES, TO BE SPLIT BETWEEN THE PARTIES EQUALLY.
4.

THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY THE

PARTIES ON FILE HEREIN SHALL BE, AND HEREBY IS, APPROVED IN
ALL RESPECTS AND RATIFIED BY THIS COURT.

SUCH SETTLEMENT

AGREEMENT SHALL BE INCORPORATED HEREIN AS IF FULLY SET FORTH

IN THIS DECREE, AND THE PROVISIONS OF SUCH SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
SHALL BE AS ORDERS OF THIS COURT.

mNm

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF ROOSEVELT
STATE OF NEW MEXICO

NO. 86-DR-161

CERTIFICATE OF EXEMPLIFICATION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
STATE OF NEW MEXICO
COUNTY OF ROOSEVELT
I,

Delores Gentry

)
) ss.
)
f

clerk of the District Court within and for the

County of Roosevelt
» do hereby certify that (3)
foregoing pages of typewritten matter constitute a true, correct and complete
exemplification of the original
Final Decree

filed and entered in the case of

TERRY B. OOGflN

Plaintiff and
T.TNDA S . frrew
same remains on file and record in my office.
I further certify that the Number of said Cause is No.
of said County.

Defendant, as the
8 6—DR—161

on the docket

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and Seal of said Court this
12th day of

,„

%

(SEAL)
Revised 1/1/83

September

f 19

88 ^

A/OGDIOA,

JhiTLqs

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
CV 2.35

UNITED STATE OF AMERICA
STATE OF NEW MEXICO
County of ROOSEVELT
I,

Fred T . Hensley

)

) ss.
)
JI

Judge of the 9th Judicial District, Division

.

State of New Mexico, do hereby certify that Delores Gentry
by whom the above
attestation was made, was, at the date thereof Clerk of said Court, duly qualified and
that the said attestation is in due form of law and made by the proper officer.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and Seal of said Court this
12th

day of

September

, 19 88

(SEAL)

DISTRICT JUDGE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
STATE OF AMERICA
County of ROOSEVELT
I,

.

Delores Gentry

)
) ss.

, Clerk of the District Court of the 9th Judicial

District State of New Mexico within and for the County of
hereby certify that the Honorable

FRED T. HENSLEY

Roosevelt

t

do

by whom the above

certificate was given and whose name is hereby subscribed, in his own proper handwriting,
was at the date thereof, Judge of the 9th

Judicial District of the State of New Mexico

and Judge of the District Court within and for the County of Roosevelt
duly
commissioned, sworn and acting.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and Seal of said Court this 12th
88
September
day of
.,19

(SEAL)

Revised 1/1/83

AtiPmo^ Jb?*rfc„
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT/COURT
JvCC

CV 2.35

IN THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

' 86 ° K i s nn 3 S3

STATE OF NEW MEXICO
COUNTY OF ROOSEVELT

C1

TERRY B. COGAN,

-ERK. DISTRICT

COURT

PETITIONER, PRO SE,
NO.

V.
LINDA S. COGAN,
RESPONDENT.

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT IS ENTERED INTO THIS _ / £ ! _ DAY OF
&£CEM/5S&_

, 198&, BY AND BETWEEN TERRY B. COGAN,

PETITIONER PRO SE, AND LINDA S- COGAN, RESPONDENT.
W I T N E S S E T H
WHEREAS, THE PARTIES ARE HUSBAND AND WIFE AMD THE
PETITION FOR DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE HAVING BEEN FILED ON

THE _ZS1__ DAY OF £ZCEW_3££_

, l*8e..

WHEREAS, THE PARTIES DESIRE TO ENTER UPON AND SETTLE
THE yUESriON OF CHILD CUSTODY, VISITATION AND SUPPORT AND
THE DIVISION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND ALLOCATION OF COMMUNITY
INDEBTEDNESS ON AN AMICABLE BASIS.
IT IS THEREFORE UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED:
1.

THE PARTIES AGREE THAT RESPONDENT SHALL HAVE THE

SOLE CARE, CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF THE PARTIES MINOR CHILDREN,
ASHLEY BRANN COGAN, BORN DECEMBER 19, 1981, AND CHONDRA MICHELLE
COGAN, BORN AUGUST 1*, 1*75, WITH REASONABLE RIGHTS OF VISITATION
ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.

PETITIONER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR A

ON THE FIRST OF THE MONTH, BEGINNING ON JANUARY 1, 1987, UNTIL
ASHLEY BRANN COGAN REACHES 18 YEARS OF AGE, BECOMES EMANCIPATED
OB UNTIL FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT.

RESPONDENT SHALL MAINTAIN

THE MINOR CHILDREN ON HER HEALTH AND DENTAL INSURANCE; HOWEVER,
ANY SUMS INCLUDING DEDUCTIBLES NOT PAID BY SAID INSURANCE SHALL
BE SPLIT BY'PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT.
2.

PETITIONER SHALL RECEIVE AS HIS SOLE AND SEPARATE

PROPERTY THE FOLLOWING:

3.

A.

1<»84 KELMART GT AUTOMOBILE;

B.

ONE-HALF OF ALL HOUSEHOLD FURNISHINGS;

C.

ALL HIS PERSONAL BELONGINGS.

RESPONDENT SHALL RECEIVE A3 HER SOLE AND SEPARATE

PROPERTY THE FOLLOWING:

4.

A.

198fo PONTIAC GRAND AM AUTOMOBILE;

B.

ONE-HALF OF ALL HOUSEHOLD FURNISHINGS;

C.

ALL HER PERSONAL BELONGINGS.

THE PARTIES OWN A HOME LOCATED AT 1011 W. WALNUT IN

ROSWELL, CHAVES COUNTY, NEW MEXICO.

RESPONDENT SHALL OCCUPY THIS

RESIDENCE AND AT SUCH TIME AS THE HOME IS PUT ON THE MARKET FOR
SALE, PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT SHALL SPLIT THE PROCEEDS THEREOF
EQUALLY.

ALL REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE ON SAID HOME LOCATED AT

1011 W. WALNUT SHALL BE SPLIT EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
5.

THE PARTIES HAVE ALLOCATED THEIR CUMMUNITY INDEBTED-

NESS AS FOLLOWS:
A.

RESPONDENT HAS PAID PETITIONER HER PORTION

OF THE COMMUNITY INDEBTEDNESS OWED DURING THE COURSE OF THEIR
MARRJAUE BY SECUIUNG A LOAN WHICH SUM WAS TURNED OVER TO
PETITIONER.

RESPONDENT SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE ONLY FOR THE

PAYMENT 01 SAID LOAN.

PETITIONFR SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR

6.

EACH PARTY SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS OR HER

OWN RESPECTIVE BILLS AND DEBTS INCURRED ON OR AFTER THE DATE
OF THE FILING OF THIS ACTION.
7.

EACH OF THE PARTIES HERETO AGREE TO EXECUTE ALL

DOCUMENTS, DEEDS, OR AGREEMENTS OF ANY NATURE WHATSOEVER WHICH
MAY BE NECESSARY TO EFFECTUATE THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT.
i

8.

THIS AGEEEMENT IS IN ALL THINGS SUBJECT TO THE

APPROVAL OF THE DISTRICT COURT AND IT SHALL BECOME A PART OF THE
JUDGMENT GRANTING THE DISSOLUTION OF THE BONDS OF MATRIMONY IN
THIS MATTER.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, THE PARTIES HAVE HEREUNDER SET THEIR
HANDS THE DATE AND YEAR FIRST ABOVE WRITTEN.

PETITIONED
STATE OF NEW MEXICO
COUNTY OF ROOSEVELT

)
)SS.

THE FOREGOING WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BEFORE ME THIS _V?HrDAY OF _.Sfccft*^**!., 1986, BY TERRY B. COGAN, PETITIONER PRO SE.
N0d2^Y PUBLIC

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:

_r__y^v*£>

.^."'aiA'TJI "'OF NEW MEXICO
/V'^OUMTY OF ROOSEVELT

iai).

. . ^
T.HE FOREGOING WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BEFORE ME THIS
1986,
BY
*j.fi\?&~QF;£&t&at
—
-•• LINDA S.
- COGAN., RESP

V*-... .-•••> ,*
c/

*>

NOTARY PUBLIC

,••

N* COMMISSION EXPIRES:

C/ahf-j&UQlg-

r• t'

• *»*

• ,< \

' re.*-. .:*

o

S

<^_

9THJUDIC/AL DISTRICT
ROOSEVELT COUNTY f u
FUEO IK i^ OFFICE

NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
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COUNTY OF ROOSEVELT
STATE OF NEW MEXICO

2i£flK.DJSTRJCT-C0Uar

TERRY B. COGAN,
Petitioner,
vs.

NO.

DR-86-161

LINDA S. COGAN,
Respondent.

STIPULATED AGREEMENT
The parties seeking to settle between themselves the
issue of child visitation, custody, and support, have made this
compromised agreement as to their rights and obligations, and
request the Court to approve this Stipulated Agreement.
The parties stipulate and agree:
1.

Child Custody and Visitation:

The Respondent, Linda S. Cogan, shall have the primary
custody, care, and control of the parties' minor children,
Chondra Michelle Cogan and Ashley Brann Cogan.
The Petitioner, Terry B. Cogan, shall have minimum
visitation rights as follows:
A.

Weekends:

Every other weekend from 6:00 P.M.

Friday to 6:00 P.M. Sunday.
B.

Summers:

The Petitioner shall have four weeks

visitation with the parties' minor children each summer, to be
exercised in one four-week period or two two-week periods*

The

Petitioner shall give the Respondent 30 days notice of the time
he will exercise the summer visitation*

The visitation shall

commence no sooner than the first day following the last school
day of the spring term, and the visitation shall end no later
than two weeks prior to the commencement of the fall term*
C* Holidays:
i» Christmas: One-half of the Christmas/New
Tear's school holiday each year ending at noon on Christmas day
in even-numbered years and beginning at noon on Christmas in oddnumbered years*
ii*

Easter/Spring

Break:

All of the

Easter/Spring Break from school in odd-numbered years*,
iii.

Thanksgiving:

Thanksgiving Thursday and

Friday in odd-numbered years*
iv*

Father's Day:

Each Father's Day without

regard to which alternating weekend in which it falls*
v*

Mother's Day:

The Respondent shall have

physical custody each Mother's Day without regard to which
alternating weekend in which it falls.
D*

The cost of transportation to effect any

visitation shall be paid by the Petitioner.
E.

Failure to exercise visitation shall not be

construed as a waiver of future visitation rights*
F.

The Petitioner. Terry B. Cogan shall enjoy

such other reasonable visitation as the parties may agree upon
2

from time to time*
2* Child supportt
A*

The Respondent, Linda S. Cogan, will maintain

health insurance on the parties' minor children*

The Petitioner

will pay any deductible amounts up to $200*00 per year if
required*

It is expressly understood that the insurance

deductible amount could be less than the maximum amount set
forth*
3*

The parties agree that each will refrain from

directly or indirectly interfering with, or hindering, in any
manner whatsoever the parent-child relationships of the parties
and the children*

Each party further agrees to monitor the

children's contact with others to ensure that other persons do
not, and are not allowed to, interfere with, or hinder, in any
manner whatsoever the parent-child relationships of the children
and the parties.

Each party further agrees to positively

reinforce and foster the children's relationship with the other
party.
4. The parties agree to keep each other fully informed
of the children's physical, emotional and jnental health.
5.

Each party when having physical custody of the

children shall not refuse the other party reasonable contact with
the children, including but not limited to phone calls at
reasonable hours and correspondence*
6. Future Effect:
The p a r t i e s

agree

that

this

Agreement

shall

be

incorporated into a stipulated order modifying the Final Decree
3

filed in this cause, and shall be in full force and effect
according to its own terms, whether incorporated by reference or
fully Bet forth in the Court records.

Terry M. Cogan
Petitioner

Li
ResDondent

Thomas E« Lilley
Attorney for Petitioner

J.^ETsetr
Attorney for Respondent

4

IN THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF ROOSEVELT
STATE OF NEW MEXICO

9TM

mri , Mll
A L D,ST

Dnnct °
«*CT
"UOSEVELT COUNTY, H M
nLEDIKifyorrV

TERRY B- COGAN,

87 DEC 21 fin 1 1 1 7
x

Petitioner,
vs.

'

K$¥%k<m~4&zfe

LINDA S.

COGAN,

CLER

*> DISTRICT COURT

Respondents

QRPER ftPPFOVINg STIPULATES ftgRESMENT
This matter having come before the court upon
Petitioner's motion for Specific Visitation and for Force
Sale of Community Residence, and Petitioner appearing with
his attorney, Thomas E. Lilley, and Respondent appearing
with her attorney, A* J. Olsen, and the court being advised
that the parties have entered into an agreement addressing
the issue of custody, support, and visitation, and the court
being well and otherwise fully advised in the premises
f i nds:
1.

The Stipulated Agreement filed herein on the 3iQ- J~j.

day of "Y^^iJLi^^vil^

1987 is fair and reasonable and

should be approved•
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the
Stipulated Agreement on file herein shall be, and hereby is,
approved and such agreement shall be, and hereby is, adopted
herein as if fully set forth as orders of this court*

Fred Hensley
District Court Judge

Submitted:

7^- ^ ^ ;
Thomas E. Li 1 ley
Attorney for Petitioner

sen
At torffey-f or-Respondent

^

F

'LEO»N GLSRK . SOJrncE
^a» Lake County uteh

W e n d e l l P . A b i e s , Bar No. 1 1
Attorney f o r Defendant
536 East 400 South
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 84102
Telephone:
(801) 532-7424

fir^*^

\**~\
NOV 2«? tQOo
/*\*/
&*J$m
C^j^^fcindiey 0^3^, n
^ 7 * « ° P'« Court
Oeputy^fe,

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TERRY B. COGAN,
mif
Plaintiff,

I ;, y
^•'m

jlrf M

vs.
LINDA S. COGAN,
Defendant.

THIRTY (30) DAY

:

SUMMONS

:

Case No. b~o*-^ I P O ^ Y P~5""

:
:
:

Judge Uav>t» f-.lul\^lvj:a^

THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFF:
You are

hereby summoned and required to file an Answer

in writing to the attached
Clerk of

Petition

for Modification

with the

the above-entitled Court, and to serve upon, or mail to

Wendell P. Abies, Defendant's attorney, 536 East 400
Lake City,

South, Salt

Utah 84102, a copy of said Answer, within thirty (30)

days after service of this Summons upon you.
If you fail so to do, Judgment by default will be taken
against

you for the relief

demanded

Modification, which has been filed with
and a copy of

in said

Petition for

the Clerk

of said court

which is hereto attached and herewith served upon

you.
Serve Plaintiff Terry Cogan:
c/o of Deason, Peters,
Stockton and Company, Certified Public Accountants, 400
North Pennsylvania Avenue, Roswell, New Mexico.
Dated this Y^

day of October, 1988.

Wendell P. Abies
Attorney for Defendant

STATE OF NEW MEXICO
_

)
COUNTY)

RETURN FOR COMPLETION BY SHERIFF OR DEPUTY:

OCTOBER 1 9 ,

I certify that I served the within Summons in said County on the

1988

' ^

day of

, 19 (j \ j T by delivering a copy thereof, with copy of Complaint
attached, and a form for Answer, in the following manner:
RETURN FOR COMPLETION BY OTHER PERSON MAKING SERVICE:
I, being duly sworn, on oath, say that I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this lawsuit, and
that I served the within Summons in said County on the

day of

., 19
, by delivering a copy thereof, with copy of Complaint attached,
and a form for Answer, in the following manner:
(checjijQffe box and fill in appropriate blanks)
-ZJ

To Defendant.
copy of Summons or refuses to receive Summons.)

•

To

(Used when Defendant receives

•

, a person over 15 years of age and residing at the

usual place of abode of Defendant

, who

at the time of such service was absent therefrom.
D

By posting a copy of the Summons and Complaint in the most public part of the premises of Defendant
. (Used if no person found at dwelling
house or usual place of abode.)

•

To

, an agent authorized to receive service of

process for Defendant

•

.

To

,

Name of person
Title of person authorized to receive service
. (Used when Defendant is a corporation or association subject to a suit under a
common name, a land grant board of trustees, the State of New Mexico or any political subdivision.)
Fees^
Signature of private citizen
making service

s/ltfM*

SHFRIFFOF
L fX^nJ^S.
State of New Mexico

»y

/J

COUNTY

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

^4^4 Deputy

Dale
Judge, notary or other officer
authorized to administer oaths

White-ftetum of Service Copy

Yellow—Service Copy

*w—uctirtrNei*jpj$

HLEODfSTlHCT COURT
Third Judicial District

Wendell P. Abies, Bar No. 11
Attorney for Defendant
536 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 532-7424

JAN I 3 1989
By

^ " ¥D*uty<afck

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COJ#£f
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TERRY B. COGAN,
Plaintiff,

:

AMENDED
PETITION FOR MODIFICATION

vs.
Case No. 502810034FJ
LINDA S. COGAN,
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson
Defendant.
Linda S.

Cogan, Defendant herein, hereby petitions the

Court for a Modification of the Decree of

Divorce entered herein

on January 2, 1987 as follows:
1.

She

is

the

Defendant

in

the above action and

resides in Salt Lake County, State of Utah together with

the two

minor children of Plaintiff and Defendant, Ashley Brann Cogan and
Chondra Michelle Cogan.
2.
Plaintiff

and

The Decree
Defendant

of Divorce
in

was entered

by and between

the Ninth Judicial District Court,

State of New Mexico, County of Roosevelt on January 2, 1987, Case
No. 86DR161,

an exemplified

copy of which is attached hereto as

Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference.
3.

Said Exhibit "A" has been filed

with the

clerk of

the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and has the
status as set forth in U.C.A., Section 78-22a-l et seq. and is in
all respects the same as a Utah Judgment or Decree.

4.

There

is

no

provision in respect to alimony in

Exhibit "A" and Defendant is entitled to an
equitable

restitution

support and

in

the

maintenance of

from 1982-1986;

when he

sum

of

award of

alimony or

$50,000.00 based on her

Plaintiff while

he attended college

was awarded a degree in December, 1986;

contemporaneously therewith divorced

Defendant;

passed

the CPA

Examination and became a CPA approximately six months thereafter.
5.

At the

time of the entry of Exhibit "A" and Order

of support money for the two
entered in

the sum

minor children

of the

parties was

of $300.00 per month for both children which

was based on the following factors:

6.
and

material

A.

Defendant's earnings of $1,410.00 per month.

B.

Plaintiff's unemployment.

C.

Chondra being in grade school.

D.

Ashley not yet attending school.

Defendant alleges
changes

of

that

the

following substantial

circumstances have occurred since the

entry of Exhibit "A:"
A.

The

Consumer

Prize

Index

has

increased by

approximately 7%.
B.

Defendant's

earnings

have

decreased

to

$1,250.00 per month.
C.
Roswell,

New

Plaintiff is now a

Mexico

and

upon

CPA with

information

minimum of $3,000.00 per month.

2

a large

firm in

and belief earns a

D.

Chondra is now attending middle school and has

additional financial needs.
E.

Ashley

is

now

attending

school

and

has

additional financial needs.
7.

Exhibit "A"

support money

should be

from $300.00

per month per child

or a

modified by

per month
total of

increasing the

for both children to $300

$600.00 per

month until the

said children reach their 21st birthday.
8-

Plaintiff prepared

all of

the income tax returns

for the parties during the course

of the

marriage based

on his

expertise in filing tax returns; his ongoing school in accounting
and business

oriented

status;

Defendant's

and

courses;

his

total

decree

lack

of

and

potential CPA

expertise and in fact

naivety in filing tax returns.
9.

The joint tax returns

for the

parties prepared by

Plaintiff and filed with the IRS for the tax year ending December
31, 1985 was negligently and erroneously
assessment from

prepared leading

to an

the IRS when Defendant does not have the ability

to pay the same and when Plaintiff has ample funds

with which to

pay the said indebtedness in the sum of $457.14 together with any
future penalties and interest.
10.
of

which

is

Paragraph 5A of the "Settlement Agreement"
attached

herein by reference, made
Plaintiff service

a copy

hereto

as

Exhibit "B" and incorporated

part

of

Exhibit

"A",

provides that

the community indebtedness and that the amount

owed to the IRS is a community indebtedness.
3

11.
"Stipulated

Paragraph 1 of Exhibit "B" and

Agreement

and

dated November 24, 1987,
Exhibit "C"

Order

shall

pay

$200.00

which is

attached hereto as

herein by reference, provides that

Defendant will maintain medical
tiff

of a

Proving Stipulated Agreement"

copies of

and incorporated

paragraph 2A

per

and dental

insurance and Plain-

child per year for deductibles if

required and one-half of any sums

not covered

by the

health or

dental insurance.
12.

Since

January

1, 1988 Defendant has maintained

medical and dental insurance on the minor children of the parties
with a $200.00 per year deductible for each and so far Ashley has
incurred medical expense in
incurred medical

the sum

expense in

Defendant $14 5.34 for Ashley

of $145.34

and Chondra has

the sum of $316.63.
and

$258.32

for

Plaintiff owes
Chondra

and has

willfully refused to pay the same.
13.
of an attorney

Defendant has been required to retain the services
to

obtain

the

modification

of

the

Decree of

Divorce entered herein and Plaintiff should be required to pay to
Defendant, for the use and benefit of her

attorney, a reasonable

attorney's fee and costs.
WHEREFORE,

Defendant

prays

for

Judgment

against

Plaintiff as follows:
1.

That she be given an award of alimony

or equitable

restitution in the sum of $50,000.00.
2.

That

support

money

be increased to $300.00 per

month per child until the children reach 21 years of age.
4

3.

Judgment in

the

sum

of

$457.10

for

income tax

deficiency for 1985.
4.

Judgment in the sum of $403.60 for deductibles and

one-half of non-covered expenses.
5.

A reasonable attorney's fee and costs.

6.

Such other relief or

modification the

court deems

appropriate under the circumstances.
Dated this ^ S ^ day of October, 1988.
Wendell P. Abies
Attorney for Defendant
STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
Linda
says as follows:
the foregoing

S.

ss.
Cogan,

being

that she is the

first duly sworn, deposes and
Defendant herein

Amended Petition for Modification; and that all of

the allegations contained therein are true
and belief

and has read

except as

to those

to her

matters alleged upon information

and belief and as to those matters, she

believes the

true.
Dated this 2^5

own knowledge

day of October, 1988.

same to be

Defendant's Address:
8843 South Alpen Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)

ss.

PATTY DAVIS, being duly sworn,
ployed by

that

she

is em-

Wendell P. Abies, Attorney for Linda S. Cogan that she

served the attached Amended
tiff Terry

says

B. Cogan

Petition for

placing a

Modification to Plain-

true and correct copy thereof in

envelopes addressed to:
Terry B. Cogan
c/o Deason, Peters, Stockton & Company
Certified Public Accounts
4 00 North Pennsylvania Avenue i
Roswell, New Mexico 882 02-1517 ,
and causing the same to be

mailed first

class, postage prepaid,

on the £??4K day of October, 1988.

Patty bavis
Subscribed and

sworn to

before me

this

^^Ht^day of

<j€iptembei', 1988.

Wn-i-v, g.
Notary Public
Residing at ffil^VLake Cilyy^ /ftah
My Commission Expires:

n-iM-qj
6

